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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
research activities of the Institute in Florence.
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1922/23 From Illusion to Disillusion
Carole Fink*
Only two years ago, in 1990, we were at the crest of the elation 
generated by the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
peaceful accomplishment of German unification. We envisaged that 
1992, the Columbus quincentennial, would be an historic year of the 
economic and political integration of the European community.
It is unnecessary for me to detail how these high expectations have 
been tempered by the realities of 1992: by its political turmoil, economic 
deterioration, and ethnic convulsions, not unforeseeable but certainly 
more dangerous and pervasive than even the pessimists anticipated. 
Contemporary European historians who two years ago basked in 
requests to provide instant analyses of remarkable events are now 
tasked with explaining the denouement, the dramatic circumlocutions of 
human political behavior on this continent, from Vukovar to Sarajevo, 
from Hoyerswerda to Rostock, from Copenhagen to London to the 
suburbs of Paris.
History has undoubtedly not “ended” with the fall of the Soviet 
empire and the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the themes and subject- 
material of contemporary historians now consist of a confusing welter 
of ostensibly vanished elements, such as the revived ethnic nationalism 
and intensified religious strife in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
rekindled economic nationalism and rising xenophobia against foreigners 
in Western Europe. The old east-west division of the continent has 
re-emerged not so much in political or ideological terms as in an 
economic and spiritual separation.
The year 1922 on which I am focusing today may provide some 
instruction and critical perspective. Europe, seventy years younger than 
today, was a region emerging from a ghastly military struggle and hard- 
fought peace; it was teetering uneasily between treaty provisions and
*
Dr. Carole Fink, Professor of History at The Ohio State University, was a guest 
of the European Policy Unit in October 1992. This paper is an edited version of a 
lecture organised in the framework of the Jean Monnet Chair.
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revisionist impulses, traditional values and revolutionary tendencies. 
There was an impressive roster of political actors: Hughes and Hoover, 
Lloyd George and Curzon, Briand and Poincaré, Rathenau and 
Stresemann, Lenin and Chicherin, Schanzer and Mussolini, BeneS and 
Pilsudski, as well as Mustafa Kemal and Chaim Weizmann, who shaped 
the postwar era with their goals, rhetoric, and actions. In 1922, at the 
three great conferences in Washington, Genoa, and Lausanne, 
European statesmen tackled issues that are highly pertinent today: the 
reduction of military and naval forces swollen by wars and revolution; 
the resuscitation of war-distorted economies in Western Europe and the 
economic and financial reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe; 
the search for security in Europe and Asia and for peace in the Near 
and Middle East. 1922 began with overweening hopes: for disarmament 
and a reparations settlement, a European security pact and detente with 
Soviet Russia. It ended on the eve of the Ruhr conflict, with several of 
its major actors gone, and new and more ruthless players on the scene; 
some of its illusions were dispelled, but others survived and took wing 
in different forms.
My purpose today is to discuss some of the guiding ideas and beliefs 
of the year 1922: their origins, their nature, and their dissemination. 
Two of my American colleagues, William Keylor and Sally Marks, have 
written eloquently of the “illusions” of the 1920s, and I shall add little 
to their excellent texts. By holding up this mirror to the mottled 
European terrain of seventy years ago, we can probe beneath the 
slogans and ceremonies to comprehend the hopes and fears, perceptions 
and misperceptions, and the efforts and the disappointments of 1922. 
The international system — much like our own — was the product of 
some objective long, medium, and short-term factors; but then, as now, 
it has been subject to cycles of human and seasonable behavior. The 
leading figures strove for equilibrium while thriving on novelty and 
change; they were both consummate public actors and captive to the 
forces of public opinion. Given their temperaments, ages, and political 
experiences, they understood historical lessons selectively and viewed 
the future through a narrow, nationalistic lens.
One especially powerful and dangerous illusion in 1922 was the belief 
in conference diplomacy as a necessary and effective tool of interna­
tional negotiation. The three great international endeavors of 1922 were 
the Washington, Genoa, and Lausanne conferences. They had deep 
historical roots, representing the continuation and expansion of World 
War I summitry as well as of 19th-century practice. For seven full years 
after the Napoleonic Wars, the Allies had assembled periodically to 
maintain their solidarity and to control events in Europe and overseas.
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After 1822, the shattered allied coalition against France was replaced 
by a looser, great-power “congress” system, which provided intermittent 
direction to European and international affairs, particularly after armed 
struggles had established new “facts.” Congress diplomacy succeeded in 
containing Russian expansion but failed to control German or Italian 
unification. It established certain ground rules for Europe’s overseas 
expansion but had no jurisdiction over Japan or the United States. 
Traditional conference diplomacy established a tacit parity among the 
great European powers, which were expected to adhere to certain rules 
and maintain an orderly international structure and flow of gold, trade, 
and investments. Small powers, often the irritants to a smoothly- 
functioning system, served as supplicants and satellites, objects and not 
participants in high-level negotiations. And great-power leaders were 
not expected to master the intricacies of military, financial, commercial, 
or social problems. Their occasional meetings established a loose 
international structure without mechanisms for regular consultation or 
coordination. Despite the pleas of certain visionaries, the European 
Powers had no intention of establishing a permanent universal organi­
zation with authority to mediate disputes and establish international 
norms of conduct.
During World War I, the frequent high-level .Allied meetings not only 
served military and economic necessity but also suited the temperaments 
of the major statesmen as well as the public’s appetite for displays of 
swift, authoritative deliberation. The peace negotiations in Paris were 
a masterwork of conference diplomacy, artfully blending a few ceremo­
nial sessions with the numerous private great-power conclaves that 
decided everything. In 1920-21 there were fifteen Allied conferences. 
The political and economic fallout of the treaties plus the proliferation 
of unresolved questions regarding Soviet Russia reinforced the 
inclination to conduct international business through improvised high- 
level deliberations.
The sheer number and urgent aspect of the postwar great-power 
conclaves, their lavish expense and the abundant numbers of delegates 
and experts — as well as the presence of press, businessmen, and other 
observers — coated post World War I European diplomacy with a 
veneer of showmanship and artifice, stimulating overweening hopes and 
fears. Conference diplomacy tended to simplify complex issues, to 
manufacture timetables, to exaggerate the distinctions between great 
powers and small; and, despite its Wilsonian rhetoric, to insert large 
doses of secrecy and dissimulation into international affairs, and also to 
expand the development of wartime intelligence services — directed as 
much against friends as against former enemies. By establishing a
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momentum of its own, conference diplomacy prevented calm and 
reasoned deliberation. Because of time-pressure and human distract- 
ibility, it linked the unconnected and divided the connected, while 
neglecting problems in the new Eastern Europe that did not scream for 
a solution, like the raging typhus epidemie and famine, the expropria­
tion and expulsion of German and Hungarian peasants, and the threats 
to the Jews. Promoting image over substance, rhetoric over reality, the 
hectic, sensational pace created a store of anecdotes and ineradicable 
impressions, such as the long-winded Rathenau at Spa, the maladroit 
Briand at Washington, the duplicitous Chicherin at Genoa, the 
implacable Curzon at Lausanne.
The three major conferences of 1922, Washington, Genoa, and 
Lausanne, were all outside the aegis, and indeed opposed to, the 
League of Nations. This new organization in Geneva, staffed by a 
youthful and devoted international civil service, had been denied 
responsibility for the chief European issues of reparations and economic 
reconstruction, security and Germany’s disarmament. Although the 
League supervised some long-term problems, such as Danzig and the 
Saar as well as mandates and minorities, and was reluctantly given 
authority to draw the contested borders for Upper Silesia, it was 
primarily expected to deal with humanitarian tasks, such as refugees and 
passports for stateless persons, the protection of labor and the struggle 
against drugs and white slavery, as well as the establishment of 
intellectual cooperation.
This Wilsonian creation, which elicited ardent support from the small 
states and from liberals and internationalists, had been crippled at birth 
by several shortcomings: by the absence of the United States, Soviet 
Russia, and Germany; by Britain’s antipathy and France’s virtual 
indifference; and by the inherent contradiction between its universalist, 
democratic assembly and the exclusive League Council. Two competing 
visions then, as now, dominated international order: one was based on 
impromptu and disjunctive conference diplomacy based on the initiative 
of the Great Powers — from the two-person, one-day Franco-British 
summit at Boulogne in February 1922 to the imposing thirty-four-nation, 
six-week Genoa meeting a few weeks later — the other was based upon 
a novice world organization, of still dubious permanence, which was in 
the process of creating sustaining institutions, meeting at regular 
intervals, and attempting to balance Great-Power desiderata against the 
needs of entire continents. Although the goals were the same — the 
maintenance of the peace established after World War I — the League 
was always subordinate. And, paradoxically, the more organized the
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League became, the less it was capable of providing the rapid and 
flexible arrangements cherished by most leaders.
To be sure, underlying the Great Powers’ ability to conduct interna­
tional business were a series of their own ad hoc structures — the 
Supreme Council, the Conference of Ambassadors, and the Reparations 
Commission — that met periodically to administer treaty-related 
questions and provided a certain measure of stability and continuity as 
well as an aura of Allied solidarity. It is nevertheless true that these 
institutions, whose deliberations were largely shielded from public 
scrutiny, magnified the Allies’ discord as much as their prerogatives.
There were other possibilities for organizing Europe. France, after 
failing to secure a straightforward Anglo-American guarantee of its 
security, attempted to surround Germany with a network of quasi 
permanent, peacetime military pacts with Poland, Belgium, and later 
with Czechoslovakia. The “Little Entente” was a loose organism to 
protect Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia against Hungarian 
revisionism. At the opposite pole was the Third International, an 
institution dedicated to subverting the Paris Peace Treaties, promoting 
socialist revolutions, and, of course, Soviet Russia’s power and 
influence. Island Britain opposed all these burgeoning arrangements, 
which fragmented the continent and impeded general disarmament.
There were also proposals for creating new regional structures, 
perhaps subordinate to the League, to supervise specific political, 
financial, transport, and minority questions. But then, as now, small 
powers as much as the great have been generally reluctant to withdraw 
themselves, and their burning questions, from the great glare of 
conference diplomacy, as if requiring the insistent prod — however 
shortsighted and short-winded — of the public spotlight. Largely 
disregarded at Paris and Genoa and absent from Washington and 
Lausanne, Europe’s small states championed the League, they formed 
ephemeral blocs, and they essentially acquiesced in a conference system 
based on the power and the initiative of the Great.
Underlying the reigning faith in conference diplomacy were several key 
attitudes. The first was a fundamental obliviousness to the revolutionary 
consequences of the war at home and abroad. Four years of death and 
destruction had squandered Europe’s wealth, distorted its economies, 
and unleashed radical elements from Dublin to Saint Petersburg. It had 
weakened Europe’s dominance over its colonies and the rest of the 
world and had primarily benefited Japan and the United States, two
9
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powers unwilling to become equal participants in governing the 
postwar world.
If statesmen publicly paid lip-service to the goal of restoring the 
illusorily golden liberal order of antebellum Europe — of free trade, 
free movement of goods and people, and a self-regulating if ultimately 
anarchic international system dominated by the Great Powers — the 
political price proved untenable. The central place of war debts and 
reparations indicated the degree to which nations preferred to focus on, 
and argue over, others’ obligations as to the key to economic salvation. 
No European political leader told his public they must assume the 
burdens themselves.
Another illusion was based on the prospect of full United States 
participation in postwar European affairs. European leaders appeared 
to confuse Wilson’s momentous presence at Paris with Washington’s 
longstanding reluctance to coordinate its policy with its fractious former 
wartime partners. The longer and more pervasive American tradition of 
neutrality was undoubtedly reinforced by Europe’s fervent pleas for its 
help and participation which starkly contrasted with the Old World’s 
still considerable stocks of arms, colonies, and financial power.
Conference diplomacy between 1919 and 1922 was haunted by the 
goal of subduing two important and resentful antagonists, Weimar 
Germany and Soviet Russia. This duo’s temporary weakness created 
disequilibrium in the new Europe. But in a longer perspective, both 
former pillars of the European system singly and jointly posed military, 
economic, and ideological perils to their neighbors and to the entire 
peace settlement. The long procession of conferences exacerbated 
Allied differences over how to handle Moscow and Berlin.
The extension of sovereignty to the new and enlarged states of 
Eastern Europe created an illusory sense of order between the Baltic 
and the Black and Adriatic Seas. All these governments were burdened 
by hostile neighbors, fragmented leadership, economic fragility, and 
acute minority problems. The leaders of Eastern Europe, including the 
deft and energetic BeneS, interposed a rigidity and vulnerability into 
postwar deliberations.
Finally, in the eastern Mediterranean, the defeat and revival of 
Turkey posed formidable political, economic, and strategic problems for 
the Allies. Sorely divided amongst themselves over their short- and long­
term interests in the Near East, they faced a hardy, victorious enemy 
with whom they would have to negotiate less imperiously than with 
Germany or with Russia. And in their old colonies and new mandates, 
the World War I victors faced an unanticipated eruption of Muslim 
sentiment that threatened their claim to rule.
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In sum, in 1922, the Allies confronted complex and insistent problems 
produced by the war and by their own decisions as well as by remnants 
of the past. Old empires had disappeared and new nation states had 
been created; revolution vied with counter-revolution; and new social, 
economic and political conditions challenged traditional values and 
mentalities. A frayed coalition of Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, 
strongly dedicated to regaining some sort of imagined normalcy, 
presumed that they could set a solid course between disciplining their 
enemies, protecting themselves and their dependents, and maintaining 
a minimum of international organization. Here was the key illusion of 
the immediate postwar period — one we have not relinquished today.
*  *  5ft
The three great conferences of 1922 were steeped in hopes to restore 
remnants of a lost past; bolster the status quo; and avoid making 
dangerous changes: Lausanne in the Near East; Washington in the 
Pacific; and Genoa in the heart of Europe. The first largely succeeded; 
the second was a moderate triumph; and the third was a costly failure.
From unpromising beginnings, the Lausanne conference was a 
triumph of international diplomacy: the issues were fairly clear-cut, and 
unified Western negotiators faced a pragmatic, if wily Turkish enemy 
who, after four tough years of fighting had utterly destroyed the Greek 
army. In return for gaining his way on borders and minority-exchange, 
Ismet Pasha was prepared to abandon his Soviet ally on the key issue 
of the Straits. The Lausanne Conference succeeded because the West, 
no longer hobbled by Lloyd George’s grecophilic fantasies, or by the 
specter of a Kemal/Lenin cabal, under Curzon’s deft if heavy hand, 
blended precedent and innovations; a durable peace in the Near East 
was created.
The Washington Conference, which was linked to major problems 
that had preceded World War I, had a more problematic outcome. Its 
guiding spirits, the two tough-minded, congenial idealists Hughes and 
Balfour, simulated an aura of achievement. They succeeded in ejecting 
the Japanese from Shantung without, however, ending other existing 
concessions in China or restoring full Chinese sovereignty. The 
troublesome Anglo-Japanese alliance was replaced by an innocuous 
Four-Power Pact, which however established no real security system for 
the Pacific. The much-heralded naval disarmament agreement among 
Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States was limited to 
capital ships and a duration of ten years, but excluded submarines and 
land forces. In the euphoria following the Washington agreements,
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several illusions were reinforced: that such cautious models could be 
applied from one region to another, regardless of the specificity of the 
issues and the selection of the invitees; that any meaningful steps 
towards disarmament could be separated from real security arrange­
ments; that Japan’s revisionism had been curbed or that Soviet Russia’s 
exclusion from an important area of its interest had been accepted or 
appropriate; that basic inter-allied differences had been mended; and 
that America’s unwillingness to become involved in the world’s political 
governance had been reduced by its one-sided initiative.
As to Genoa, I could of course say a great deal; but the subject has 
been amply treated in two monographs written in the mid 1980s and in 
collection of essays published in 1991 by Cambridge University Press 
entitled Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922. It is 
nevertheless useful to evaluate the Genoa Conference in the context of 
the illusions, the suppositions that were tested and found wanting, in the 
spring of 1922.
At Cannes in the beginning of January 1922 the British premier, 
David Lloyd George convinced the Supreme Council to invite Soviet 
Russia, Germany, the other former enemy states and the neutrals, to a 
huge summit meeting to “remedy the paralysis of the European system.” 
Desiring to detach his country from the constricting obligations of treaty 
enforcement, Lloyd George formulated an elaborate project that 
involved reestablishing political and economic ties with Moscow, the 
economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe, and the 
creation of a new Great-Power condominium that included Germany 
and Soviet Russia to fill the security gap, promote disarmament, and 
bring economic prosperity to Britain and to the ailing European 
continent. Notwithstanding French disapproval and American disinter­
est, Lloyd George rallied much of Europe and the British dominions to 
his revisionist design.
There were, of course, considerable risks created by a huge, open- 
ended gathering like the Genoa Conference which threatened to 
obliterate the distinction between winners and losers, diminish the 
League of Nations, and sow permanent discord among the Allies. 
America’s refusal to participate eliminated the most significant source 
of fresh capital for Europe’s renewal. When Raymond Poincaré 
replaced Briand after the Cannes Conference, France removed most of 
the significant issues — especially German reparations — from Genoa’s 
agenda. And, the host, Italy weakened by domestic strife between its 
fascists and communists, exerted little influence as promoter of the 
conciliatory “spirit of Genoa.”
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, The two outsiders at the Genoa conference had a disproportionate 
influence over its outcome. Soviet Russia, desperate for loans and 
investments, faced a stiff and perilous price for a truce the West and 
the support of its capitalists; full debt recognition, the complete return 
of confiscated property, and the total disavowal of its revolutionary 
project and the work of the Third International. Germany, denied any 
prospect of reparations relief or of playing a significant role in Western- 
Soviet negotiations, also faced the admittedly-remote prospect of an 
Allied-Soviet arrangement that might raise its reparations bill. The two 
pariahs exploited Lloyd George’s glittering occasion to create a counter- 
Genoa. At a private meeting on Easter Sunday, the foreign ministers of 
Germany and Soviet Russia, Walther Rathenau and Georgi Chicherin, 
signed the bilateral “Rapallo” agreement, which fractured capitalist 
unity, doomed the Genoa Conference, and exposed the brittleness of 
the Paris Peace Settlement.
The Genoa Conference, which lasted five more weeks and produced 
a dismal follow-up conference at the Hague, expired from its creators’ 
lack of flexibility, coordination and ability to take the first steps towards 
peace. There are nevertheless instructive lessons fiom this first major 
encounter between the capitalist and communist worlds in 1922. After 
four and a half years of rigid and fairly hostile relations, both sides 
suddenly offered hints of accommodation which ultimately could not be 
fulfilled. Lloyd George was hamstrung by the West’s widespread fear of 
communism, by disunity in the Allied camp, and by his own political 
weakness and personal shortcomings. Lenin too was constrained by the 
fierce internal debate between bolshevik purists and pragmatists and 
also by his failing health, which removed him from wielding power at a 
critical juncture. Throughout the winter and spring of 1922, both sides 
tried to outdo their antagonists with surprise, bullying, heavy doses of 
propaganda, and divide and conquer tactics; both sides were weighed 
down by distorted perceptions and apocalyptic views the other; both 
sides held unrealistic views of the others’ economic strength or 
weakness; and, ultimately, both sides shrank from any meaningful 
compromise that threatened their interests and their power. In a 
broader sense Genoa’s failure discouraged future searches in the 1920s 
for forms of coexistence. A negative model of open-ended international 
negotiation, it reinforced the intransigent forces on both sides that 
preferred ideological correctness and old-fashioned power politics to 
exploring uncharted methods of political and economic contact. It 
increased Moscow’s long-term estrangement from the West, whose 
repercussions are still to be examined.
13
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
The failure of detente with Soviet Russia had a mixed result for 
Eastern Europe. On the one hand, with the bolshevik threat temporarily 
checked, it artificially solidified a status quo of borders, like Poland’s, 
which extended far into former czarist territory but had no real Western 
guarantees of their permanence. On the other, Soviet Russia’s virtual 
retirement from the larger diplomatic scene provided little incentive for 
the border states to create durable security arrangements for their 
collective defense against their most dangerous neighbors. The Little 
Entente provided Romania with no protection from Russia (nor 
Czechoslovakia from Germany or Yugoslavia from Italy). A fierce state 
nationalism and robust anti-communism dominated the new and 
enlarged states of Eastern Europe, which distorted their political 
development, opposed any risk of outside tutelage and control, and also 
smothered most democratic initiatives.
The inconclusive outcome of the Genoa Conference also tested of 
the old concept of “neutrality.” The six non-combatants in World War I 
(Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), 
which had been excluded from the peace treaties but not from the 
League, found themselves adversely affected by postwar economic 
conditions — in stark contrast with their remarkable wartime prosperity. 
In 1922 they had searched earnestly before Genoa for a unified strategy 
to promote their and Europe’s financial recovery; but this illusion soon 
burst. Due to their disparate power and interests, they failed to 
coordinate their strategies and tactics. There could be no “neutrals’ 
bloc” not simply because of their divergent attitudes towards France 
and Britain, Germany and Soviet Russia. The neutrals were caught in 
this predicament: their inherent opposition to the peace settlement 
made them supporters of the revisionist camp; their loyalty to the 
League placed them alongside the small, new states; and their social 
and economic conservatism aligned them behind the traditional great 
powers, thus muting their preferred role as special pleaders for justice, 
democracy, and stability.
One of the great postwar illusions, nurtured by Woodrow Wilson, was 
centered on public diplomacy — “Open covenants openly arrived it.” 
With the expansion of self-determination and democracy, it was 
assumed that an informed public opinion would assert a responsible 
control over state policy, preventing the recurrence of crises such as 
1914. The use of photographs, film, and radio as well as the press would 
inform this popular opinion; indeed, most governments hastened to the 
printing press with masses of edited documents on the war’s origins and 
aftermath, supplemented by a flood of semi-official memoirs.
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One of the most powerful and elusive factors in historical analysis, 
the state of public opinion in 1922 defies easy categorization. Predict­
ably, there was widespread popular disillusionment over the paltry 
rewards of four or more years of privation, of social, economic, and 
political regimentation, and of propaganda barrages and heavy 
censorship. To be sure, the costs of the war had been unevenly 
distributed within particular countries and throughout the continent. 
The initial elation of peace had been replaced over large areas of 
Europe by mounting unemployment, inflation, and taxes. As demobiliza­
tion proceeded at an uneven, often painful pace, a wary and resentful 
public, repeatedly assured by its governments that others would pay the 
costs, waited impatiently for relief and prosperity.
As usual, the press was rife with caricatures of faithless friends and 
perfidious enemies, barrages of patriotism and suave ex-enemy 
propaganda; the solid wartime certainties were replaced by a disorderly 
international atmosphere, complicated by a bewildering array of 
technical questions that in some roundabout way affected jobs as well 
as the price of bread and lodging and transportation and health care. 
Politicians and diplomats who paid considerable attention to their 
images timed their arrivals, conference openings, and press conferences 
to the popular evening press. But the cycle of public-opinion creation 
and response in the 1920s defied scientific precision. The ringing words 
and steely self-confidence of a Lloyd George or a Lenin could momen­
tarily arouse masses of supporters; but, like today, mounting unemploy­
ment figures, closed factories, and diminished trade sent more insistent, 
more dangerous signals that politicians were helpless to control.
The peaceful, democratic public opinion envisaged by Wilson failed 
to materialize after the first World War for several reasons. First, 
despite all the rhetoric, there was no real peace until 1921, when 
conflicts had finally ceased on the borders of Russia and of Turkey; and 
even on May Day in 1922, Trotsky was still saber-rattling against 
Moscow’s neighbors. Second, it is conceivable that the procession of 
postwar conferences — with their public scorecards of political and 
economic gains and setbacks — increased, rather than reduced, enmity 
among peoples and nations. Nationalist parliamentary majorities kept 
a tight rein on their leaders’ latitude for compromise. And as seasoned 
spectators to numerous diplomatic bouts, the public demanded victory 
and punished losers. In 1922, Briand, Schober, Skirmunt, Schanzer, 
BeneS, and Lloyd George were all forced to resign over their 
diplomatic debacles.
Anti-war and pacifist sentiment, which spread through veterans’ 
groups and women’s organizations as well as in socialist and communist
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quarters, failed to turn the public into partisans of military and moral 
disarmament. Except for tiny groups of ardent supporters, the League 
of Nations failed to inspire popular opinion because of its indistinct 
identity, technical tasks, and neglect by major world leaders; and 
fledgling organizations such as the World Court and the International 
Labor Office remained largely obscure. With Wilson gone, no European 
leader seemed capable of blending abstract ideals and political power. 
Lloyd George tried, and failed, at Genoa.
* * *
1922 was a relatively active and peaceful year in European diplomacy 
that left principal European questions unresolved: relations with Soviet 
Russia were put on ice; disarmament was delayed; and collective 
security postponed. However, the two key economic questions that were 
inextricably tied to European politics — inter-Allied debts and German 
reparations — could not be deferred indefinitely. The American 
government had demanded debt negotiation with its allies. Germany, in 
massive default on its reparations payments, asked for a continuation of 
its 1922 moratorium. In January 1923, the Reparations Commission 
voted three to one to send troops into the Ruhr to force German 
payment. Poincaré prevailed over Britain in what was France’s final 
opportunity to enforce the Versailles Treaty. In the ensuing year-long 
struggle, German resistance and Anglo-American pressure ended 
French dominance over the reparations question. With the Dawes 
agreement of 1924, Germany’s reparations were reduced, France’s 
coercive power destroyed, and the Anglo-American insistence on 
decoupling economic issues, security, and political power triumphed. 
The door was now open to a revision of the Versailles peace on terms 
negotiated with the defeated.
Many illusions ceased with the French invasion of the Ruhr; but new 
ones were created. The German question became the main issue of 
European peace; despite loud threats, neither the Soviet government 
nor the Poles took any steps to intervene during the Ruhr crisis. Europe 
held its breath, while the German currency skyrocketed and Hitler made 
his first effort to seize power in November 1923.
Gustav Stresemann, who ordered an end to Germany’s passive resis­
tance and took drastic measures to strengthen the economy in late 1923, 
embarked on an audacious revisionist path of splitting the Allies, 
restoring German strength, and revising the Treaty. The Ruhr occupa­
tion, which had given France temporary economic benefits, rent the 
Western Alliance; and the outcome delivered the coup de grace.
16
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
Poincaré fell in May 1924; Britain rejected the Geneva Protocol in 
November; and in January 1925 Stresemann came forward with the 
proposals leading to the Locarno treaties, signed in October 1925 that 
effectively revised the Versailles peace.
Locarno signified that the Allies had failed in their attempt to 
dominate Germany. In return for accepting its Western borders, 
agreeing to arbitrate disputes in the East, and acquiescing in some 
limitations on the Reichswehr, Germany regained much of its diplomatic 
status as a great power without surrendering its special ties with 
Moscow. France, which at Locarno was denied ironclad security 
guarantees for itself and its eastern allies, virtually surrendered to 
Britain and to Germany and began building the Maginot Line. Britain 
resumed its pre-1904 role of balancer.
The Locarno treaties “decoupled” the issues of reparations, security, 
and politics. France could no longer use reparations to cripple 
Germany; nor could the Germans use their economic frailty to harass 
and divide the Allies. This decoupling undoubtedly benefited Germany, 
which was larger and economically stronger than France. Stresemann 
was free to proceed slowly and cautiously with his short- and long-term 
aims of liberating German soil and expanding Germany’s economic and 
military power.
The Locarno treaties are associated with the venerable term 
“appeasement,” which was rooted in prewar British policy, reemerged 
in 1922, and shifted its focus in 1925. But it was a notably more limited 
appeasement than envisaged by Lloyd George at Genoa. It meant 
solving one great specific problem — to Germany’s benefit — and 
leaving the rest unsettled. A far conservative episode than Genoa, the 
five-power Locarno conclave, with its circumscribed agenda, all but 
excluded the small states. Whereas Lloyd George’s aspiration at Genoa 
was for a comprehensive settlement linking all former enemies under a 
mantle of appeasement, Locarno was an essentially pro-German, anti- 
Soviet proceeding that anticipated the diplomacy of the 1930s. Locarno 
was held outside the aegis of the League of Nations, whose structure 
and future had nevertheless been adversely altered. Germany’s 
permanent seat on the Council, its exemption from Article 16 — the 
obligation to engage in economic or military sanctions in the case of 
Soviet aggression against Poland —, and the evaporation of the 
League’s power to punish potential German treaty violations, consti­
tuted a near reversal of Germany’s defeat in 1918.
With flamboyant, if empty toasts to lasting peace Locarno whittled 
down the Paris Peace settlement without constructing anything solid to 
replace it. Soviet Russia remained excluded from the European system;
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the United States and Japan remained resolutely disengaged; Italy 
under Mussolini was moving into the revisionist camp, and the East 
European states between Berlin and Moscow were more vulnerable 
than ever. During the next four years, the Locarno tea-partners, Britain, 
France, and Germany lacked the power, prestige, unity of interests, time 
and even inclination to replace the tattered Versailles with a new global 
political and economic order. If all seemed well and peaceful, coopera­
tive and stable until 1929, it was an illusion.
* * *
What conclusions can we draw from these hopeful, cautious, and 
ultimately misguided steps seven decades ago? It is by now a truism that 
the Paris Peace Settlement lacked mechanisms for adjustment and 
proper enforcement, because the victors in World War I had neither the 
strength nor the cohesion to rule the postwar world and the defeated 
were still strong and unrepentant. As revisionist strength and pressure 
mounted, the titular upholders wavered and dispersed; the Paris 
creations — the new and enlarged states, the League of Nations, and 
certain innovations like the Minority Treaties — were sacrificed to a 
resurrected, and illusory “balance of power” system which, from 
Locarno to Munich, destroyed European peace.
European diplomats after World War I were faced with a baffling 
complex of questions relating to ideology and politics, finance and 
economics, security and disarmament. The Washington and Lausanne 
Conferences of 1922 succeeded, because their tasks were limited. The 
Genoa Conference of 1922, which tried to tackle everything at 
once, failed.
The result was to reinforce the Anglo-American inclination to 
separate issues, to employ ostensibly neutral experts, and to construct 
“businesslike” solutions to seemingly technical, non-political questions. 
This sowed another dangerous illusion for European order, creating a 
perilous, fragmenting practice with its own artifice, politics, and public 
confusion. French politics and security were inextricable from the 
matters of reparations and war debts. Stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe was tied to individual states’ economic performance, to their 
domestic integration, and to their ability to constrain their neighbors’ 
appetites. Each time a prop of the Versailles edifice crumbled in one 
place, it did weaken the whole.
Germany and Soviet Russia would inevitably have regained their 
strength. The problem that was raised, and not solved, in 1922 was how 
to weigh traditional balance-of-power considerations with the new
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sacred principles of self-determination and democracy; how a durable 
peace might be constructed despite considerable disparities of size, 
wealth, and national cohesion; how sovereignty was to be respected and 
protected while at the same time creating a stable and prosperous 
continent.
Remnants of the past coupled with brutal wartime experiences made 
the immediate postwar period a breeding ground of radical forces of the 
right and the left. By 1920 democracy had lost its momentum in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and ruling parties everywhere exuded strong doses 
of chauvinism and intolerance as well as protectionism and autarchy. 
The sense of a tainted victory and unadmitted defeat, of nostalgia and 
defiance, of anxiety and resentment permeated the political atmosphere. 
New constitutions, institutions, and leaders grafted upon aged 
disharmony had little prospect of succeeding without concerted and 
active intervention from outside. In the vacuum left by Wilson, and in 
the wake of Lenin’s excesses, where would these positive tutelary 
forces emerge?
1922 represented a moment like our own of challenge and risk. At 
the Genoa conference Lloyd George and his supporters launched an 
idealistic effort laced with British pragmatism, self-interest, and short 
attention-span, to shape Europe’s future: to merge old values with new 
realities before national antagonisms became so solidified that another 
war would become inevitable. His counterparts in Washington and 
Moscow, Paris and Berlin, Rome and Prague — and the people behind 
them — were undoubtedly too scarred by the war and too buffeted by 
its confusing aftermath to foresee the opportunities and to avert the 
dangers before them.
Victory in 1918, as in more recent times, came with a heavy price. 
The Europe Lloyd George attempted to “reconstruct” at the giant 
Genoa Conference was an economically, politically, and spiritually 
divided continent that required patient, persistent, knowledgeable, and 
organized effort to restore all of it to health, prosperity, and peace. And 
although this illusion was ostensibly dispelled seventy years ago, it has 
been revived, with comparable needs, hopes, prospects, and impedi­
ments, in our own time.
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